Poverty Alleviation in the Wake of Typhoon Yolanda¹

Workshop Findings: Working Paper I

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The following observations are drawn from the opening workshop of the ESRC/DFID funded project (Ref: ES/M008932/1), ‘Poverty Alleviation in the Wake of Typhoon Yolanda’. The workshop was held on 30 September 2015 at Balay Kalinaw, University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines. Delegates at the workshop were drawn from academia, civil society, the business community and the military². Around 50 delegates attended the workshop. All of the delegates involved in the workshop were experts or had experience in disaster relief either in the field or as a topic of academic and policy research. Experts were drawn from the Philippines, Cambodia, Myanmar and Thailand. In some cases workshop delegates were on the ground during Typhoon Yolanda (international name: Haiyan) or the immediate aftermath. The workshop was composed of three panels entitled: ‘Poverty Alleviation in the Wake of Natural Disasters’, ‘Livelihood and Community’ and ‘Governance and Resilience’, and a closing round table discussion.

The purpose of the workshop was to facilitate an exchange of ideas and reflections on disaster planning. The purpose of this paper is to outline key themes and issues that were

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raised during the workshop. Many of these ideas will inform the direction of our project and will be used to test the circumstances under which the post-disaster environment can be ‘built back better’. In broad terms the issues raised during the workshop were either material, including financial aid and relief goods, or social, including family and community resilience, institutional capabilities and politics. However the distribution and control of material resources is a social activity that inevitably reveals underlying power structures, political objectives and also powerlessness or a lack of capabilities. The following observations are not intended as research conclusions but rather as issues for consideration and testing.

This paper starts with a brief outline of typhoon Yolanda and the effect on the Eastern Visayas region in order to put our themes in context. The paper then addresses the issue of how natural ‘natural’ disasters are. We address the political nature of disasters and the extent to which disasters may be capitalised on in order to further political aims and objectives. We argue that disasters have to be seen within a social context as relief and rehabilitation have to be sensitive to local and national social contexts in order to be effective. This applies to politics but also to community and family hierarchies. Hierarchies evolve over a number of variables that can include religion, age, class, ethnicity and gender.

**Typhoon Yolanda in context**

On 8 November 2013 super-typhoon Yolanda hit the Visayas region of the Philippines. Yolanda was one of the strongest typhoons ever to make landfall. The damage was catastrophic. Official figures indicate that 6,293 individuals were reported dead, 1,061 went missing, 28,689 were injured and vast areas of agricultural land were devastated\(^3\). The typhoon affected 591 municipalities and total damage is estimated at US$904,680,000. The total number of people affected by this disaster in terms of livelihood, environmental and food security is approximately 16 million people. The Visayas region, home to some of the poorest provinces in the Philippines, was left with many more people destitute due to Yolanda. The city of Tacloban became the ‘poster town’ for the impact of Yolanda. Tacloban sits near the head of the Leyte Gulf. It is a rapidly growing and highly vulnerable urbanized

\(^3\) However the death toll for Yolanda is highly contested as a body had to be presented to the authorities in order for a death to be recorded. In many cases this was not possible as bodies were either swept away or families resorted to burying their own dead in the face of inaction by the authorities. See i.e. Gabieta, Joy (2014) ‘Yolanda Death Toll Still Vague 8 Months Later’, *Philippines Daily Inquirer*, 2 July. Available at: [http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/616060/yolanda-death-toll-still-vague-8-months-later](http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/616060/yolanda-death-toll-still-vague-8-months-later). Accessed 19 October 2015.
area. A major cause of death for Tacloban and other Yolanda hit areas was that Yolanda was accompanied by a ‘storm surge’ that was 17 feet high in places. Local residents failed to appreciate the meaning of ‘storm surge’ (as opposed to tsunami) and in some cases failed to evacuate despite warnings in advance of Yolanda’s landfall.

The social construction of disaster

Throughout the workshop the delegates repeatedly raised the issue of how natural ‘natural’ disasters are. Just as risk and resilience are socially constructed so too are understandings of what is natural.

How natural are ‘natural’ disasters?

The impact of ‘natural’ disasters is arguably modified by human behaviour in terms of both the scale and severity of the environmental phenomenon and the organisation of human settlements. Humans are increasingly, by accident or design, living in densely populated, highly vulnerable areas. Consequently the material damage and death toll from disasters is greater. Not because the environmental magnitude of disasters is necessarily greater but because of the increased density of human settlements in environmentally fragile areas. This is particularly true of coastal areas. The sea is a source of livelihood for coastal communities and water is the cheapest way to move goods.

The urban poor are extremely vulnerable to natural disasters. Communities are often unregulated, over-crowded and there is scant possibility of squatter or slum-housing meeting risk compliant building regulations. Urban population growth consistently outpaces rural population growth. Over 40% of the Philippine urban population lives in slums. The city of Tacloban, that bore the brunt of typhoon Yolanda, was a rapidly growing and highly

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vulnerable urbanized area. ‘Over 20 years, the city’s population has risen by 62%, from 136,891 in 1990 to 221,174 in 2010. Population density has increased from 679 / sq km in 1990 to 1,096 / sq km in 2010’. Tacloban has a large community living in ‘informal’ housing. This community was both most at risk from the typhoon and least able to resurrect itself after the disaster. This is why our project has chosen to focus on urban vulnerability to disasters.

Are disasters political?

The politicisation of disasters was raised repeatedly in our workshop. The focus of our project is not to investigate the party or personality politics that were evident in the aftermath of typhoon Yolanda. However the partisan, dynastic, family based and often corrupt nature of politics in the Philippines meant that political infighting over the Yolanda relief effort was inevitable. This state of affairs was exemplified by Interior and Local Government Secretary Mar Roxas’ comment to Tacloban Mayor Alfred Romualdez to remember that ‘you are a Romualdez and the president is an Aquino’ during a discussion over the organisation of the Yolanda relief effort. In other words be mindful that you are from opposing political clans when assigning the disaster relief responsibilities of local and national level governments.

In the aftermath of disasters questions of who gets what, when and how much inevitably come into play. Disasters can also be politicised for short term aims by different individuals, parties and sectors. Some politicians also take advantage of disaster situations and political rivalries are exposed. Victims, mostly displaced, understandably want immediate help. However political infighting and the desire to capitalise of the situation as a ‘benefactor’ can hinder the distribution of relief goods. For instance some politicians and government agency personnel were accused of decanting international aid into bags decorated with political


9 Alfred Romualdez is the nephew of former First Lady Imelda Marcos; her hometown is Tacloban. The Marcoses and Aquinos are historic political adversaries.

10 Please see here: ‘Yolanda Telling Off Tacloban Mayor Alfred Romualdez’. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g_oxV8ylgOI. Accessed 20 October 2015.
colours for political gain\textsuperscript{11}. How various levels of government react, or are perceived to be reacting, will affect how people view them, i.e. either as saviours or enemies of the victims. Aid or assistance, including shelter and resettlement, is also political. Distribution and prioritization are political.

We anticipate that the coming 2016 elections will affect the reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts as local and national politicians seek to appeal to the voters at local and national levels. It is possible that funds will be released in the immediate run up to the election to curry favour with voters. It is also possible that political opponents will accuses each other of this strategy\textsuperscript{12}.

\textit{Gender}

The Global Disaster Alert and Coordination System (GDACS), local and national government officials, the state weather bureau (PAGASA), the Department of Science and Technology's Nationwide Operational Assessment of Hazards (Project NOAH) and the media warned of the need for evacuation, especially in coastal communities, prior to Yolanda. As is the norm many men and older boys stayed to guard households whilst women and children went to evacuation centres. However many people did not evacuate at all as they were used to typhoons and did not expect the intensity of the typhoon or the storm surge that came with it. The failure to take evacuation warnings seriously resulted in many deaths. The decision not to evacuate was made on the basis that previous typhoons had not been ‘that bad’ and there was no previous experience of a storm surge in living memory. We anticipate that the number of women-led households and women as primary earners has increased post-Yolanda. However we are also aware that men, women and children all perished as evidenced by the


list of casualties released by the national government. From the list it is clear that many children died, as they were unable to protect themselves when the storm surge came. Various agencies have sought to factor gender into both disaster risk reduction and relief and rehabilitation. During the workshop safety in evacuation centres and relocation sites was raised as a key issue. Often evacuation areas are not safe or suitable for women and children. Evacuation areas were not purpose built and lacked adequate electricity and sanitation facilities. This was the case at the Tacloban Astrodome. The Astrodome saved many lives but it was not equipped for its temporary residents to stay for an extended period of time. Subsequently many Yolanda victims were living in tents for up to two years. This is a situation that clearly poses difficulties in terms of physical safety, emotional well-being and dignity. The issue of safe and adequate sanitation facilities and adequate living space is an issue that continues to affect internally displaced persons (IDPs) still living in temporary housing in Yolanda affected areas. The failure of the government to adequately address these issues was highlighted by Chaloka Beyani, The United Nations Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced persons, who commented that:

Many families remain housed in collective “bunkhouses” that do not meet necessary minimum standards for the provision of basic needs and services and create numerous safety and protection challenges, particularly for women and


girls who face threats including sexual abuse and early pregnancy, as well as failing to provide conditions of privacy and dignity.  

Women and children are also vulnerable to trafficking in the frequently chaotic aftermath of a disaster. They may remain vulnerable in the longer term because of extreme poverty. This situation may be exacerbated if ID and other personal documentation are lost during the disaster. Cases of prostitution and violence increased after Yolanda. Leyte and Samar had already been identified as ‘trafficking hotspots’ and Yolanda simply served to exacerbate vulnerability.

Other Affected Groups

In the course of our workshop discussions it became evident that gender (female) was often highlighted as a specific area of vulnerability; however other groups such as children, the elderly or youth faced their own specific set of problems. For out-of-school youth opportunities such as educational access could be curtailed and the elderly or less able might face significant problems in terms of their well being in the face of physical vulnerability or loss of family members. The loss of family members, especially if they were the main earner in a family, impacts on all family members, especially the most vulnerable. More broadly this can have an impact on the well-being of entire communities. This can be exacerbated when communities are fractured or relocated; hence the need for psycho-social care and community rebuilding. Younger children typically lost three months of schooling after Yolanda and many have had to change schools due to temporary relocation and are likely to have to do so again when permanent relocation sites are completed. This is to say nothing of the actual trauma of going through the typhoon. For some children this has left a lasting legacy as they

have lost parents or other family members. Many agencies also report that children are anxious about another typhoon and are fearful of the wind.

Disasters also reveal the following:

- Underlying patterns of discrimination (including political);
- Vulnerability which is socially constructed;
- Risk and ‘risky’ behaviour (how and why decisions are made in relation to risk at multiple levels including the individual and the community);
- Capacity or lack of capacity (resilience); and
- Corruption (is corruption resilient under conditions of disaster?)

National and Local Governance in Disaster Risk and Reduction Management: Accountability, Coordination and Governance

Under this heading a number of questions were raised:

- It was proposed that R.A. 10121 increases the capacity of local government units (LGUs). This is an issue that will be examined against the legislation and in practice over the course of our research.
- Who are the stakeholders at different stages of recovery and rehabilitation? The answer to the question might involve a stakeholder mapping exercise.
- To what extent have LGUs complied with national mandates? Should they even do this? Where does the power lie? How can we measure this? Why are LGUs waiting for guidelines from the national government?
- Who steers the rehabilitation process in each LGU? Why the differences in approach? Why are there different success rates? How can this be measured?

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• As the immediate aftermath of Yolanda revealed, most LGUs had no or limited recovery and rehabilitation plans or have unrealistic Disaster Risk Reduction and Mitigation (DRRM) plans. Why? How can we prove this?

**Previous findings**

In the Department of Science and Technology (DOST) and UP College of Social Work and Community Development project that produced the book *Shifting Paradigms*\(^2^4\), the researchers found that:

- DRRM councils in the areas studied (four sites in Guiuan, Eastern Samar; Palo in Leyte and San Francisco in Cebu) were not set up except in the island of San Francisco, which had zero casualties and damages were relatively low due to established mangroves.
- Land use plans were not observed with house developers given certificates to build even in danger zones.
- There was no contingency planning.
- Damage Analysis and Needs Assessment (DANA) exists only in San Francisco.
- Interventions from government and non-government/international agencies such as the donation of fishing boats, rice seedlings that are not resilient to the weather conditions, loans for small livelihood, cash/food for work, etc., were not backed up by solid planning and assessment. If unregulated these strategies could turn out to be detrimental to communities and the local environment.
- There is no “build back better” and vulnerabilities have not been addressed.
- Resettlement areas are still in danger zones.

These issues and the accompanying data can be cross-checked in our project, specifically in Palo as we have also chosen to examine that LGU. In the workshop discussions the following problems were also identified:

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\(^{2^4}\) Bagawan, A. B. et Al. (2015) *Shifting Paradigms: Strengthening Institutions for Community-Based Disaster Risk Reduction and Management*, College of Social Work and Community Development, University of the Philippines. Available at: [http://cswcd.upd.edu.ph/?p=4680](http://cswcd.upd.edu.ph/?p=4680). Accessed 20 October 2015. Some of the authors of this project were at the workshop and were able to discuss their findings with us.
• In the issue of shelter, it is very difficult to make authorities accountable. People feel powerless as they cannot even use local media for help since political families also influence or control local media.

• Coordination was a key problem in the Yolanda areas. Most protocols were done haphazardly and no simulation testing was done at any level of government. This is not a problem unique to Yolanda. In Cambodia, early warning systems exist but flows of information are not working well. In the case of Hurricane Katrina the simulation ‘Hurricane Pam’ was run in 2004. In 2005 Hurricane Katrina revealed the limitations of disaster planning even when the effects are reasonably accurately predicted.

Clearly it seems to be the case that disaster, risk and reduction planning is reactive rather than proactive. The Philippines lies within the Ring of Fire and is also on the Pacific Typhoon belt. As such the chance of future disasters is high.

First Responders

LGU officials and local emergency service personnel were also victims of Yolanda, so it is also understandable that there should be protocols for higher levels of government to have an active role in situations where LGUs will not immediately be able to act. This was the case in Typhoon Yolanda as many government security service personnel and their families were victims of the typhoon themselves. However since the typhoon various parties have accused each other of being unprepared, although there is a consensus that no one could have predicted a ‘storm surge’ that was tsunami like in strength and effect.

There were also logistical problems in the region as debris made many of the roads impassable. This led to differing opinions over the following:

• National and local government responsibilities;

• The role of the military (especially foreign military personnel);28;

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25 However geo-hazard maps were released by the Mines and Geosciences Bureau of the Department of the Environment and Natural Resources (MGB-DENR) in 2012


The merits and appropriateness of cash for work programmes: Was it a good idea to give people cash with little or no checks on actual needs of recipients? Was it appropriate for people to be paid to clear their own backyards? Did this contribute towards aid dependency?

What is the actual death count for typhoon Yolanda? This is highly disputed as people resorted to burying their own dead and many bodies are still missing. In which case the death was not recorded, as a body could not be produced to the authorities.

**Governance: The Medium Term Response**

The Philippine government, LGUs and local communities and individuals received a high volume of international aid. However there are still problems with relief and rehabilitation including housing and livelihood. This leads to a number of questions:

- Has aid been under-utilized? If so, why?
- Is it because government has low absorptive capacity? If so why is this? (e.g. problems with procurement and bureaucratic procedures)
- Where should accountability lie? At the local or national level?
- How effectively did international donors coordinate with the Philippine government at the local and national level?
- How effectively did the emergency response phase convert into the rebuilding phase?

The government is still very important, especially in addressing climate change issues, but should ideally be supported by other sectors and non-state actors. There should also be champions at the local government level. Officials and leaders at all levels must be accountable to a rigorous process of checks and balances to ensure sound planning, transparency and fiscal accountability. However there is a history in the Philippines of government employees, up to and including the president, being incarcerated on charges of

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fiscal mismanagement and corruption. This has led to officials being over cautious in financial management and rehabilitation projects stalling due to the slow release of funds. A balance needs to be struck between accountability and efficiency. Sometimes, capacities and perspectives of national government agencies also need to change. For instance, the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) appears to be unwilling to share its database with aid agencies. However, this may also be because the agency itself lacks the necessary database.  

Nevertheless several national agencies are assuming responsibility for international agency pilot projects on resilience and climate change adaptation in Yolanda areas and are now applying them region-wide, e.g. seasonal crop rotation, introducing higher level processing of crops produced. 13,639,552,418 PHP (£200,558,000) worth of crops were lost to Yolanda, the vast majority of which was down to the loss of coconut produce. Six million coconut trees were lost. It takes between six to ten years to re-establish coconut as a crop once it is destroyed. Meanwhile the DSWD is continuing to identify sustainable livelihood opportunities under the Accelerated and Sustainable Anti-Poverty Program (ASAPP) of the Human Development and Poverty Reduction (HDPR) Cluster. It is also working towards a ‘community driven approach to livelihood rehabilitation’.  

It was suggested during the workshop that there is a need for systemic change in disaster management. Some suggestions for improved Disaster Risk Reduction Management (DRRM) are as follows:

- Adequate preparation and planning;

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• Integrated and comprehensive approaches with governments and communities working together, with the help of community based organisations (CBOs), international aid agencies, the private sector, experts and scholars;

• Setting up an accountability unit to monitor DRRM with local champions;

• Reorienting farming to produce for health and food security instead of immediate production and income;

• Making resettlement areas resilient, located in safe areas, and with sufficient and sustainable livelihood opportunities and basic services, with communities resettled as a unit wherever possible so as not to disrupt social capital any more than is necessary; and

• Building Back Better taking heed of previous experience With efforts based on lessons from the past so that previous mistakes are not repeated: What were the mistakes made in previous cases? Have these been repeated? Are there best practices?

Coordination with Civil Society and Other Non-government Groups

If government does not or is unable to act quickly and effectively for relief and rehabilitation, then civil society and international relief agencies can step in. This is imperative in the immediate aftermath of a disaster but it raises a number of issues in the longer term including the ownership of policy and accountability. Workshop panelists argued that critics should not only just criticize the government as this is a purely negative strategy. Instead they should be prepared to identify strategies and to implement them. Despite differences, they must be able to ‘enter government sideways’ and work on common issues, with civil society organisations (CSOs) pressuring the government to act and working with government agencies in specific areas. Non-government agencies can provide specific expertise and innovation. They are also less hamstrung by red tape and political infighting (although this still exists within NGOs) and should aim to work in tandem with the government in order to consolidate scaled up and resilient policy. Civil society is not yet doing much in the area of development and rehabilitation but it should be engaged more. We found that a particular issue was reporting and cross-referencing between NGOs/INGOs and the government. Therefore:
Relief and rehabilitation need to be integrated and coordinated within cases. To what extent have agencies communicated information effectively?  
If there have been lapses what is the cost in terms of relief and rehabilitation?

Private companies were active in the emergency relief stage of the disaster and continue to donate funds until now. The business sector in Eastern Visayas aims to increase household income as a means to alleviate poverty. The business community is now working with different levels of government to promote inclusive growth, although there are differences in priorities. However, the business sector wants resettlement sites that are resilient and equipped with basic facilities while national government’s priority is building a sea wall. Before Yolanda, the private sector in the area was weak and left DRRM and poverty alleviation to the government. After Yolanda, the private sector stepped in and was instrumental in having no casualties during Typhoon Ruby in 2014.

A number of issues were also raised in relation to the donors’ distribution of aid. These are as follows:

- Funding mostly focused on short-term relief but not suitable for the conditions of the area, e.g. boats (too many), seeds (wrong kind), etc.
- Some donors were tasked with rapidly spending the money allocated and distributing goods quickly. The priority seemed to be reporting on the job done and the number of beneficiaries ‘helped’ rather than a practical and forward thinking distribution of resources. (We have since found that this is a major issue with fishing boats. This phenomenon was seen previously after the Indian Ocean Tsunami and now repeated here.)
- Aid allocation should respect local communities and local knowledge.

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• There may be ‘turfing issues between donors’; some communities and beneficiaries have asked if they are being used or exploited. A stage may also be reached where victims become fed up with aid initiatives if nothing much seems to change in terms of the conditions of their existence. If locals are not involved in decision making then they may also become aid dependent.

• Aid agencies should focus on helping government planning instead of simply giving aid to communities; goal should be to empowered communities in the long-run through sustainable poverty alleviation.

• Climate change adaptation finance or aid from abroad is currently spent half on reconstruction and half on rehabilitation. It is not spent on adaptation which should actually be the focus of aid. Why is this the case?

Shelter and Relocation

In all of the LGUs that this project examines, residents are being moved away from the coastal ‘danger zones’ (or no-build zones) and inland to higher ground. However this raises a number of issues including the merits of moving people at all. There is a clear tension between relocation and livelihood. Residents, especially fishermen, rely on the sea for their livelihood. The problem is particularly acute in Tacloban where the northern resettlement barangays are perhaps 20 kilometres from the sea. Whilst it is possible to travel back to the sea the cost of transport, the security of boats, access to markets and a lack of refrigeration are clearly issues. The tension between safe housing and secure livelihood will be an ongoing problem for the relief effort. Water security is also a major concerns for the resettled communities as some places are still without permanent piped water supplies and relied on trucked water for their daily water needs.

No Build Zones

Pre-Yolanda ‘no build zone debates’ were evident in Manila, for example in the areas around the Pasig and Marikina Rivers34 (especially after Typhoon Ondoy). The ‘no build zone

policy’ is a hotly contested topic and is currently being reviewed for its legality by the Department of Justice under Justice Secretary Leila de Lima. Meanwhile the Philippine House of Representatives passed Resolution No. 947 in March 2014, which called for an inquiry into the ‘No-build Zone, No-dwell Zone policy’. This debate is likely to be heightened if the proposed tidal embankment project, running from the San Juanico Bridge to the municipality of Tolosa, goes ahead.

The embankment is controversial in Tacloban as thousands of people still live in the ‘no dwell zone’. If the embankment went ahead before residents were adequately relocated they would be left with nowhere to go. There is also a debate over the cost of the embankment as the provision of adequately equipped permanent alternative housing in the northern barangays has proven to be a painfully slow process. Critics say that the money would be better spent on housing and the provision of adequate utilities and services in new communities in safe zones. At the moment even the permanent housing that is completed in Tacloban is under occupied due to inadequate utilities, especially water which has to be shipped in by tanker.

However there are examples elsewhere of good practice, e.g. in Bicol. Due to public education and community involvement in geo-mapping and land use planning exercises, people are moving away from hazardous areas. For this project we are interested to compare best practices across Tacloban, Palo and Tanauan and what drives these either materially, socially, geographically and in terms of good governance and strategy.
The implementation of the Emergency Shelter Assistance (ESA) programme of the government has also suffered from a number of problems. Under this scheme designated beneficiaries are allocated 30,000PHP for a totally destroyed house and 10,000PHP for a partially destroyed house\textsuperscript{40}. Problems have occurred when people have failed to be recognised as beneficiaries. The money is only intended for people (with some caveats\textsuperscript{41}) who have no permanent source of income and whose houses were located in ‘safe or controlled’ areas which means that families in the ‘no-dwell zone’ do not qualify for the money. Those living in the ‘no-dwell zone’ are technically assisted by the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC); however, progress has been painfully slow. If those in the ‘no-dwell’ zone have not been rehoused or do not have the means to relocate using their own resources, which is the situation in the majority of cases, then residents were forced to rebuild using their own meagre resources or whatever non-governmental help they can access. This has resulted in the construction of multiple precarious dwellings in the ‘no-dwell’ zone as people simply have nowhere else to go.

Notwithstanding the problems of allocation there are questions over what will happen to the dwellings that people leave behind. Will these be demolished? If so who will be responsible for this and if not is there the danger that they will be taken over by others moving into the area or the original residents if they choose to return. Some agencies, such as ‘All Hands’, have ignored the guidelines and have helped people rebuild in the ‘no dwell zone’. There seems to be little appetite amongst local government officials to stop this happening.

\textit{Transitional Shelters}

In Tacloban, government funded bunkhouses are managed by the City Government and transitional shelters are managed by a combination of the City Government, the DSWD, the Office of the Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery (OPARR), USAID and other non-governmental national and international agencies (e.g. Oxfam, Tzu Chi and GMA Kapuso). As of 28 October 2015 there were 954 completed transitional shelters, 613 of which were occupied and 344 of which were vacant. The situation in these houses and shelters can be difficult. Electricity, water supply and toilet facilities are inadequate or absent.


There is also a difference in size and aesthetics between the bunkhouses and other transitional shelters. The bunkhouses do not meet international standards. The Philippine government have explained this away as not applying to temporary residents, however it has now been two years since the typhoon and many residents are still stuck in temporary housing. Many communities hence are considering the possibilities of these temporary housing as their permanent place of stay.

**Permanent Shelter**

Land rights have been a problem for the rebuilding of permanent shelters, as there is not enough suitable land available for rebuilding. Often land is either under private ownership, too expensive or too hilly. Land also needs to be acquired in lots big enough to allow for economies of scale in rebuilding homes the necessary utilities and services. It is easiest to assist rebuilding in safe areas with documented land rights and hardest to help families in the no dwell zone without land rights. 13,062 permanent housing units are planned in Tacloban, 297 have been completed but only 77 were occupied as of October 2015. The under occupation can be explained by a lack of utilities. The allocation of permanent shelters is also an issue. During the workshop the following issues were raised:

- The victims’ views were not taken into consideration during the decision-making process regarding shelters and they were not aware of the selection criteria for beneficiaries.
- The shortage of electricity in temporary shelters.
- Some resettlement areas are in danger zones.
- In Palo, NGOs/humanitarian agencies supplied their own settlement criteria in terms of selecting beneficiaries.
- Building permits may have been waived.

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Figures supplied by Tacloban City Housing and Community Development Office, 28 October 2015.
• UN Rapporteur Chaloka Beyani reports that the Philippine government has not done enough. He states that the Philippine government’s response to IDPs is ‘inadequate to date’.

• There have been land acquisition problems. Safety permits are an issue as is agreed approval of sites by local government and central government. The Philippine governance system complicates the processes. There is little available suitable land and land needs to be acquired in lots of at least a hectare to make building schemes viable.

• Contractors are given the same unit price per unit no matter how remote the housing is. This means that far flung housing is likely to be less attractive to developers.

**Poverty and Livelihood**

The Eastern Visayas (Region XIII) was one of the poorest regions in the Philippines before Yolanda. It had a poverty incidence among families of 37.4% in 2012, a score that was only lower than the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) with a score of 48.7%. It was also one of only three regions in the Philippines, the other two being the ARMM and Socksargen (Central Mindanao), which suffered from an increased rate of poverty between 2006 and 2012. In the first half of 2014 Region XIII registered 54.9% poverty incidence, slipping second poorest to poorest region in the Philippines post Yolanda.

The industry in the Eastern Visayas is dominated by agriculture and fisheries. However, these industries have been on the decline for a number of years. Various reasons have been given

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44 Beyani, Chaloka, op. cit.
for this including the 2008 financial crisis and the weather\textsuperscript{47}. In 2013 agriculture, forestry and fisheries recorded a negative growth of 6.6\%\textsuperscript{48}.

Development strategies in post-disaster situations should be sustainable, inclusive and taking into account local knowledge and practices. Livelihood should be addressed beyond the level of immediate need or bare subsistence and involve cooperatives and the scaling up of production. A balance needs to be found that can foster local economies of scale and comparative advantage whilst avoiding ‘disaster capitalism’\textsuperscript{49}. Livelihood training should involve business training as well as practical skills. However it also needs to be recognised that not all people are natural entrepreneurs, so some flexibility would be needed in allocating equipment and responsibilities. Checks and balances need to be put into place to ensure that the people who are offered equipment and training do actually intend to use it. This may need to go beyond just asking the recipient as cultural norms may dictate that a negative response to the offer of aid is seen as either rude or may inhibit offers of future aid.

The issue of experts within communities was also raised. Do locals actually need outside help from international ‘experts’ to create livelihood strategies or are they better left to organise this themselves? At what point should they be expected to be self-sustaining?

Issues in relation to this might include:

- Capitalising on existing, and providing a platform for new, skills and knowledge;
- Transfer of knowledge between the local and the international which should be a two-way process;
- Donor agenda: To what extent is local need compatible with the focus and administrative capabilities and timescales of donors?; and
- Retaining working strategies and patterns of cooperation and support already within communities.


Trust and Social Capital

Social capital can be defined as a ‘set of norms, networks, and organisations through which people gain access to power and resources, and through which decision making and policy formulation occur’\(^{50}\). Social capital can be positive and foster community security but it can also be negative in relation to nepotism and corruption. It is also culturally situated\(^{51}\). Therefore the idea of community and social capital plays out differently in different disaster situations. In areas where disasters impact upon communities that already have high levels of resource scarcity and/or ethnic tension, violence and corruption relief and rehabilitation work is rendered doubly difficult because of this underlying instability. Solidarity and trust in the communities may be fragile or absent and impede on the ability of communities to scale up self-help. In these cases rehabilitation work may well involve working with civil society to help rebuild trust and community resilience. Social vulnerability relates for example to attitudes towards risk, capability building and the strength or weakness of coping mechanisms including ‘emergency reserves operating at individual, family and community levels’\(^{52}\).

However in Leyte (unlike other areas of the Philippines such as Muslim Mindanao), there are no warring factions (notwithstanding the difficulties between the local and national government) or insurgent movements. This means that rehabilitation strategies in Leyte should be able to avoid attrition from social fragility or violent attack. However this also means that effective rehabilitation may be context specific and lessons learned from good practice in one case may not necessarily transfer easily to another.

Some points to further reflect upon include the following:


• Some communities have high social capital and are used to working with each other during periods of crisis (i.e. during recurring typhoons)\textsuperscript{53}.

• In the Philippines, some communities have very high social capital and members want to stay together even when they get relocated. This is important to account for when devising livelihood and poverty alleviation strategies. If relocation is done in a haphazard fashion then individuals may ‘experience a net loss by relocation. External forces or conditions that pressure people into doing something that they do not want to do contribute to stress and vulnerability’\textsuperscript{54}.

• Elsewhere in the case of communities in Burma/Myanmar, while the government has the coordination function, communities rely on members in helping each other during calamities and do not expect/rely on help from outside.

• How do existing social networks work and how can they be tapped for disaster response and rehabilitation?

• Embedded social wisdom should not be ignored. There had been previous storm surges in Tacloban\textsuperscript{55}. It was noted that inter-generation wisdom had been passed down as regards the areas of the city that were safe to build on and evacuate during typhoons. This process of learning from previous experiences should be revived in addressing future problems. The success of this was evident during Typhoon Ruby in 2014 when no casualties were recorded.

• Locals should be involved in planning and implementation, especially in shelter plans.

• In communities, the first instinct is generally not to harm others. Looting was reported post-Yolanda but was this ‘looting’ or a search for basic needs such as food and water? If there were looters, were these people local or from outside of the area? Has this been sensationalised by media?

• To what extent did people migrate towards the areas where disaster relief was a clear focus (Tacloban) and how did non-locals affect or distort relief efforts?


To what extent do disasters escalate urbanisation amongst young people? In Cambodia as well as in the Philippines and other parts of Asia, young people are leaving rural areas to go to urban areas. Rebuilding in rural areas, including addressing community, development and poverty issues, after disasters should take this fact into consideration.

**Resilience and Risk**

Resilience can be defined as ‘the capacity of any entity – an individual, a community, an organisation, of a natural system – to prepare for disruptions, to recover from shocks and stresses, and to adapt and grow from a disruptive experience’\(^{56}\). Genuine resilience should be rights-based, with the goal of improving adaptive capacities and addressing and reducing vulnerabilities and risks. Resilience should also operate on a positive trajectory. The experience of disaster should also lead to future effectiveness in mitigation, response and adaptation. Lessons should be learned within and between cases.

People and communities may well have their own versions of resilience. This involves the combination of indigenous knowledge as well as appropriate science and technology that is explained in understandable language instead of scientific jargons. However there is a danger that the use of the term resilience can be used by governments or relief agencies to dismiss the real needs of communities. Indeed communities may define themselves as resilient, and be proud of that, when really they are struggling to cope. Calculations of resilience and vulnerability and need to be social as well as physical otherwise relief strategies may not be sustainable. The following points should be considered:

- What and who is resilience for?
- How can we measure this?
- What fosters and undermines resilience?
- How/why is resilience distorted and how can we understand this in a social and political sense?
- In times of calamity, resilience should be viewed from the perspective of communities. Communities should be self-sustaining and collectivity should be

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fostered. To what extent should resilience be about self-help and does this change over time?

- There are dangers in resilience being driven by donors. Strategies may be inequitable, based on neo-liberalism ideology (see point above about disaster capitalism), focusing on humanitarian intervention and failing to embed in local communities.
- Are there tradeoffs in development paths; i.e. do neo-liberal strategies undermine community-based resilience? To what extent can these be aligned so that they are mutually supporting?
- What was the coverage of psychosocial care in the aftermath of Yolanda? Who was able to access this resource? Who were the providers? What was the impact?
- To what extent has resilience been built through the arts?
- How has healing and remembering been articulated and expressed by communities?
- “Building back better” as a concept may not be good for resilience of communities in the long-run. For example, in the aftermath of the tsunami in Thailand, this can mean ‘business as usual’ or ‘business instead’ of local patterns of livelihood. This in turn can affect the resilience of communities.
- To what extent is corruption resilient? How successfully do corrupt strategies reconfigure themselves to disaster situations?
- Who and what is the monitoring of risk and resilience for? Does the answer to this question dictate how risk and resilience are measured?

**Ways Forward**

In terms of moving forward based on the sharing of experiences and insights during the workshop, a number of recommendations came out. These are as follows:

1. Various groups, whether government or nongovernment, national or international, already have Yolanda-related assessments. There needs to be a sharing of these

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assessments. The current project can help in facilitating this process of sharing and consolidating assessments.

2. An integrated information management system is needed?

3. There is a need to discuss the pros and cons of the proposed tidal wall.

4. The culture of donors needs to change from short-term to longer term solutions.

5. Local voices need to be heard in disaster prevention and poverty alleviation; power dynamics need to change at different levels.

6. Resilience needs to be related to rights using the rights-based approach.

7. Local resilience, whilst being a good thing, can also be seen as a failure on the part of the ‘duty’ bearers, i.e. government.

8. Multilevel governance is obviously required in these situations and stakeholders must work together despite differences to provide sustainable solutions to poverty and risks related to natural disasters.

9. While it is easier to hold governments and politicians accountable and blame them for failures, accountability should be across different sectors.

10. A holistic approach instead of piecemeal approach should be the goal in interventions and solutions.

11. Formal versus informal networks must be taken into account in any DRRM plan.

12. For all stakeholders, there needs to be a shift from proactive to reactive disaster response.

In terms of research and education, the workshop was able to identify a number of roles or responsibilities of academics and experts. They are as follows:

- Documenting and synthesizing lessons and assessments learned from Yolanda other cases as basis for planning;
- Information dissemination and capacity-building of communities;
- Documentation of local knowledge, including not just narratives of survival and terminologies, but cultural manifestations of people’s experiences through poems, photographs, paintings, etc. and how these are used for individual and community healing and understanding of events;
- Addressing non-physical damages like psychosocial trauma;
- Developing manuals using people’s own terminologies and harmonizing them with those developed by other academics, international agencies, and CSOs; and
- Improvement of available database.

The above responsibilities should be approached as a multidisciplinary effort.